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I.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 34(c) and 35(c), Appellants Buckskin Properties, Inc. and
Timberline Development, LLC (collectively "Buckskin") submit this Reply Brief in rebuttal to the
arguments and additional issues raised by Respondent Valley County in its Respondent's Brief filed
on December 29, 2011. To the extent Valley County raised cross issues on appeal as a CrossAppellant, Buckskin will file a separate Cross-Respondent's Briefpursuant to IAR 35(b).
Buckskin incorporates the statement of the course of proceedings and facts in its opening
brief here. In short, Buckskin filed a Complaint alleging two separate causes of action: (1) that the
Road Development Agreement ("RDA") it entered into with Valley County to pay a road impact
fee on Phases 2 and 3 of its planned unit development The Meadows at West Mountain ("The
Meadows") and Valley County's road impact fee scheme under its Land Use Development
Ordinance ("LUDO") and Capital Improvements Program ("CIP") is an illegal fee or tax because
Valley County failed to comply with the requirements of the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act
("IDIF A") to collect impact fees; and (2) inverse condenmation.

Valley County moved for

summary judgment on Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim, which the district court granted on
grounds that the inverse condenmation claim was untimely under the applicable statute of
limitations. Buckskin then moved for partial summary judgment on its claim for a declaratory
judgment on the issue of an illegal tax or fee, which the district court denied on grounds that all
Buckskin's claims accrued at the same time and were untimely.
Buckskin appealed and addressed those issues in its Appellant's Brief. Valley County filed
its Respondent's Brief and raises several additional issues on appeal, arguing issues and matters not
decided by the district court, but arguing additional defenses to its actions. As set forth in this Reply
Brief, the district court's grant of Valley County's motion for summary judgment and denial of
Buckskin's motion for partial summary judgment were in error. Further, Buckskin's additional
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defenses are not applicable and do not warrant a confilTI1ation of the lower court's decisions.
Rather, this matter should be remanded to be detelTI1ined on its merits.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Buckskin's Federal Taking Claim is Properly Before the Court.
1.

Buckskin was not required to plead its federal claims under 42 U.S.C. section
1983.

Valley County states that the district court dismissed Buckskin's federal claim on the
basis of a failure to plead 42 U.S.c. § 1983.

See Respondent's Brief, p. 13.

This

mischaracterizes the district court's holding. At best the district court ignored Valley County's
section 1983 defense. While the district court may have ultimately dismissed Buckskin's claims
for statute of limitations purposes, the dismissal had nothing to do with a failure to plead the
federal claims under section 1983.

The district court simply indicated that, with regard to

pleading a section 1983 claim for inverse condemnation, Buckskin was "not required to do so
because they have a valid claim pursuant to the State constitution." R. Vol. III, p. 489. This
hardly constitutes a dismissal of the federal claim under section 1983. If anything, it indicates
that the federal claims were properly pled, but ultimately subject to the district court's
application of the statute oflimitations.
Nonetheless, Valley County's position with regard to Buckskin's federal takings claim
and 42 U.S.c. § 1983 is incorrect. Buckskin was not required to seek relief for its federal claims
in this case under section 1983. A party may bring an inverse condemnation action seeking the
payment of just compensation directly under the Fifth Amendment because of the self-executing
character of that constitutional provision.

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of

Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal. 482 U.S. 304, 314-315 (1987); see also BHA Invs, Inc. v.
City a/Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 175 n. 2 108 PJd 315,322 n. 2 (2004) (recognizing that in Idaho
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takings plaintiffs may proceed directly under the Fifth Amendment or section 1983). Buckskin
properly pled a takings claim in this action independent of filing a section 1983 cause of action.

2.

Buckskin's federal takings claim is not unripe under Williamson County.

Valley County also asserts that Buckskin's federal claim fails under the two part ripeness
test of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172 (1985).

The two-pact test requires that: (1) the govemmental entity reach a final

decision; and (2) in federal court litigation involving regulatory takings, the property owner must
seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided. Id. at 186, 194.
The Williamson County "finality" test is met in this case because Valley County already
took Buckskin's property in the form of a right of way of real propel1y and payment of impact
fee money. See Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (9th Cir.2002) (once
property is taken, the finality test is satisfied). The second prong of the Williamson County test
requires that the property owner must first seek just compensation through state inverse
condemnation and be denied before litigating in federal court.

Williamson County at 194.

Buckskin, having filed this action seeking among other things, a remedy for 1l1verse
condemnation, has rendered the second Williamson County ripeness test inapplicable.
B.

Buckskin's State Law Claims Are Not Barred For Not Seeking Judicial Review
Under The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act.
The County argues that Buckskin's claims seeking inverse condemnation and declaratory

relief are impermissible collateral attacks because 'judicial review" under the Idaho
Administrative Procedures Act ("IAPA"), Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho Code, is the only means
for addressing Buckskin's claims.

Therefore, the County contends that the courts lack

jurisdiction to hear Buckskin's inverse condemnation and declaratory actions in this matter. The
County's position on this issue is wrong because:
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(1)

Buckskin's challenge to the County's use of a ROad Development Agreement

("RDA") and the charging of an impact fee are not "permits" under Idaho's Local Land Use
Planning Act ("LLUPA"), Title 67, Chapter 65, Idaho Code, and therefore is not reviewable by
way of judicial review under the lAP A;
(2)

There was no "adverse zoning decision" in this case that required Buckskin to file

for judicial review with the district court;
(3)

The out of state cases cited by the County have no persuasIve value to the

application of Idaho's LLUPA;
(4)

Judicial review under the lAP A cannot afford the relief Buckskin requests; and

(5)

The exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case and

therefore judicial review under the lAP A is not applicable.
1.

Both Road Development Agreement and Impact Fees are not a "permits"
under LLUPA and therefore not subject to judicial review under the IAPA.

"To obtain judicial review of final action under LLUPA, there must be a statute granting
the right of judicial review." Stafford v. Kootenai County, 150 Idaho 841,252 P.3d 1259 (2011).
"Idaho Code § 67 -6519( 4) grant[ s] the right of judicial review regarding applications for a permit
required or authorized under LLUPA." Id. at Idaho 846 (citing
2003 Sess. Laws 373, 374).

I.e.

§ 67-6519(4), Ch. 123, § 1,

Similarly, LLUPA's section 67-6521 allows an affected person

having an "interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of
a permit authorizing the development .... seek judicial review"

I.e.

§ 67-6521 (1)(a)and (d), Ch.

199, § 1, 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 620-621.
This Court has recognized that not all land use decisions are subject to judicial review
under the lAP A. For example, in Giltner Daily, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 PJd
1238 (2008), this Court detennined that there was no statutory right to judicial review of the

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - 4

county's decision to amend its comprehensive plan because "[a] request to change a
comprehensive plan map is not an application for a permit." !d. at 633, 181 P.2d at 1241.
The same conclusion was reached in Burns Holdings v. Madison County Board of County
Commissioners, 147 Idaho 660, 214 P.3d 646 (2009), where the denial of an application for a

comprehensive plan amendment was not a permit. Id. at 663, 214 P.3d at 649. The Burns Court
also held that an application for a rezone, which the appellant had simultaneously applied for,
was also not a "permit" under LLUPA: "[a]n application for a zoning change, like a request for
an amendment to a comprehensive plan, is not an application for a 'permit,' and thus no review
is authorized under the LLUPA." Id.
The claims raised by Buckskin in this lawsuit likewise have nothing to do with a "permit"
under LLUP A. Therefore, judicial review is inapplicable. First, Buckskin is not challenging a
denial of its conditional use permit ("CUP"), the CUP was granted; it is challenging the
imposition of an impact fees collected at the time of final plat. The imposition of an impact fee
is not a permit under LLUP A and there is nothing in LLUP A authorizing judicial review under
lAP A regarding the collection of impact fees. Buckskin's challenge to the imposition and actual
collection of impact fees can only be brought by way of a direct action, such as a through a
declaratory lawsuit.
Second, Buckskin's RDA is not a permit under LLUPA and its challenge to the validity
of its RDA cannot be subject to judicial review under the lAP A. While LLUPA may authorize
the use of development agreements for certain purposes, a development agreement is not a
"permit." As such, Buckskin's RDA is not a "permit" under LLUPA and therefore is not subject
to judicial review under the lAP A.
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2.

There was no "adverse zoning decision" in this case that would require
judicial review.

Valley County argues that Buckskin's claims seeking inverse condemnation and
declaratory relief are impermissible collateral attacks because "judicial review" is the only means
for addressing Buckskin's claims. Valley County discusses this Court's holdings Bone v. City of
Lewiston, 107 Idaho 844, 693 P.2d 1049 (1984) and Curtis v. City of Ketchum, 111 Idaho 27,
720 P.2d 210 (1986) in support of its argument. Both cases are factually distinguishable from
this case and have no application.
Bone involved a land use permit application seeking to rezone propeliy from low density
residential use to commercial use. Bone, at 846, 693 P.2d at 1051. The City Council denied the
application and Mr. Bone filed suit in district court requesting declaratory relief and a writ of
mandamus forcing the City to enact a zoning ordinance that would allow the rezone to
commercial.

Bone at 846-847, 639 P.2d at 1051-52.

This Court held that Mr. Bone's

declaratory action and writ of mandamus could not be brought because judicial review under
Idaho Code § 67 -5215(b-g) of the IAPA, was the "exclusive source of appeal for adverse zoning
decisions." Bone at 848, 693 P.2d at 1053. (underlining added).
Shortly after the Bone decision, this Court reached the same conclusion in Curtis v. City
of Ketchum, 111 Idaho 27, 720 P.2d 210 (1986). Curtis involved a claim brought by Mr. Curtis
against Ketchum for inverse condemnation alleging that the city had taken his property because
the city denied his 1982 subdivision application. ld. at 32-33,720 P.2d at 215-16. The Curtis
Court held that Mr. Curtis' argument was nothing more that a "challenge to the city's quasijudicial action denying his subdivision application" and he had to comply with former §67 -6519
and 6521(d),' which required judicial review under the former IAPA section 67-5215(b)-(g). ld.

I Since the Curtis decision, I.e. § 67-6521 was amended in 1996 to include (2)(b) which allows an affected person
to seek inverse condemnation in lieu of judicial review. See. Ch. 199, § 1, 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 620-621.
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The facts of this case are distinguishable from Bone and Curtis. The actions challenged
by Buckskin do not involve Valley County's denial ofa permit or a challenge to Valley County's
quasi-judicial decision making authority.
Unlike the Bone and Curtis applicants, Buckskin's permit (i.e. the conditional use permit
(CUP)) was granted. Buckskin was not aggrieved by the decision of Valley County. There was
no "adverse zoning decision" that triggered Buckskin's obligation to file for judicial review.
Buckskin is not arguing that Valley County's decision to grant its CUP is wrong. This case is
and has always been about whether the County can charge an impact fee. Buckskin's challenge
to the County's ordinance, the RDA's and the actual collection of impact fees has nothing to do
with challenging the County's quasi-judicial role to consider a pennit.
The facts and holding in McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 851 P.2d 953
(1993) support Buckskin's arguments. McCuskey involved a dispute over the zoning status of a
parcel and denial of a building pem1it. Mr. McCuskey requested a building pennit for a gas
station, but was denied by Canyon County because his property was zoned mral residential,
which did not allow gas stations. Id. at 658-659, 851 P.2d at 954-55. Unbeknownst to Mr.
McCuskey, Canyon County had rezoned his property seven years earlier from heavy industrial to
mral residential. Id. Mr. McCuskey file,d a declaratory action challenging the County's zoning
ordinance on the grounds that he was not given notice of the rezone. Id.
On appeal, this Court held that the requirements of Bone did not apply to Mr. McCuskey
because he was not arguing that the County made a "wrong zoning decision," but rather Mr.
Bone was challenging the validity of the County's ordinance. Id. at 660, 851 P.2d at 956. Here,
Buckskin is doing the same thing as Mr. McCuskey.

Buckskin is not challenging Valley

County's decision to grant its CUP. Buckskin is challenging the RDA's, the LUDO provisions
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purporting to authorize the use of these agreements to collect impact fees, and the actual
collection of the impact fees.
Further, the fact a development agreement is referenced in the section of Buckskin's CUP
entitled "Conditions of Approval" does not make it an adverse zoning decision subject to judicial
review. One could conceivably argue that a permit condition is an "adverse zoning decision"
under Bone that is subject to judicial review. That argument has no application to the facts of
this case because the requirement that Buckskin to enter into a development agreement for the
payment of impact fees was not a condition of the CUP itself, but rather a requirement of the
County's PUD ordinance under its LUDO. The statements referencing a Development
Agreement and Capital Contribution Agreement in the CUP are purely informational of what the
County's ordinance requires.
Generally, the purpose of attaching conditions of approval to a permit is to set forth
requirements that would not otherwise be required by state or federal law, local ordinances, or
policies. It is important to note that conditions of approval placed on a permit are site specific
and/or application specific that are applied on a case by case basis. For example, a county's
local ordinance may have standards regarding subdivision entrances (i.e. regulating width,
lighting, etc), but would not address entrance location. A permit condition could be attached
directing the applicant to locate the entrance on a specific corner of their property.
In contrast, language contained in a permit that recites matters that are uniformly
enforced on all applicants, whether pursuant to law or local ordinances or local policies/practices
are not "permit conditions."

Those statements are purely informational and are not tied to

anything site specific or application specific.

For example, a statement, such as the one in

Buckskin's CUP, that says an applicant "must comply with the laws of the State ofIdaho" is not
a "permit condition" subject to judicial review regardless of whether the applicant agrees with
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the statement. It defies logic to think that if that statement were omitted from the permit, then
the applicant is free to violate Idaho or federal law.
In this case, Buckskin's CUP contains statements under the heading "Conditions of
Approval" that include:
Conditions of approval:
1. The application, the staff report, and the provisions of the Land Use and
Development Ordinance are all made a part of this permit as if written in full
herein.

4. The issuance of this permit and these conditions will not relieve the applicant
from complying with applicable County, State or Federal laws or regulations or
be construed as permission to operate in violation of any statute or regulations.
Violation of these laws, regulations or rules may be grounds for revocation of the
Conditional Use Permit or grounds for suspension of the Conditional Use Permit.

12. The Development Agreement and Capital Contribution Agreement must
received approval from the Board of County Commissioners.
R. Vol. II, p. 332. These statements are not permit conditions.

It goes without saying that

Buckskin, like every other applicant, must comply with provisions of the LUDO and must
comply with state and federal law. Those sentences provide information to the applicant and are
not a condition on the permit.
The same is true for the sentence referencing the development agreement in condition
number 12.

That statement is informational because it merely notifies Buckskin that the

agreement needs approval from the County Commissioners. The requirement to enter into that
agreement, however, comes not from the CUP, but from the County's PUD section in its LUDO
(R. Vol. II, p. 298) and Valley County's policies as explained in the County's 2008 Master
Transportation Plan (see Appellant's Brief p. 5 for text). Thus, the infom1ational statements in
Buckskin's CUP are not permit conditions that, if Buckskin disagreed with, would qualify as an
"adverse zoning decision" and require judicial review as described in Bone.
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3.

Administrative remedies do not provide the relief plaintiffs seek.

The administrative appeal process through judicial review would not provide Buckskin
adequate judicial process or a proper remedy for

~he

relief it seeks.

When a district court

entertains a petition for judicial review, it does so in an appellate capacity. Burns Holdings v.

Madison County Board of County Commissioners, 147 Idaho 660, 662, 214 P.3d 646, 646
(2009).

This Court distinguished an administrative appeal from a civil action in Euclid Avenue

Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853 (2008) and held that an administrative appeal
and a civil action cannot be combined in the same proceeding. The Euclid Court reasoned:
The separation of civil actions and administrative appeals is supported by good
policy underpinnings. After all, one proceeding is appellate in nature and the
other is an original action. They are processed differently by our courts.
Discovery is rarely available in a judicial review proceeding. The review is to be
conducted on the record, absent specific authorization. I.C § 67-5276. The
standards for determining an outcome are specified by statute (I.C. § 67-5279),
whereas this is not the case with actions seeking declaratory or monetary relief.
Jd. at 308,193 P.3d at 855.

Here, Buckskin's claims for inverse condemnation and request for declaratory relief
cannot be combined with judicial review.

A court sitting in an appellate capacity has no

authority to award monetary damages or issue an order striking down an ordinance. In addition,
the court has no authority under the lAP A to enjoin Valley County from continued attempts to
collect an impact fee without first adopting an IDIFA-compliant ordinance.
Judicial review also would not provide Buckskin adequate judicial process to defend
against the County's "voluntary payment" defense. Discovery is limited in judicial review and
the court is limited to the administrative record. Had it not been for the opportunity to conduct
written discovery and take depositions, Buckskin would not have discovered evidence of the
mandatory nature of Valley County's road impact fee program. This includes the statements
found in Valley County's 2008 Master Transportation Plan describing the mandatory collection
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of roadway impact fees nor would Buckskin have discovered the various developers who were
also subject to the payment of these mandatory road mitigation fees. Judicial review was simply
not the right proceeding for addressing Buckskin's claims.
4.

Out of State Cases Are Distinguishable

Land use authority arises from statute.

Each state has its own umque statutory

framework governing land use matters. Valley County suggests that this Court should adopt the
holdings of the appellate courts from Washington and Maine, which held that under Washington
and Maine law the collection of an impact fee is subject to each state's particular administrative
procedures act and the timeframes for seeking judicial review. These out-of-state land use cases
are not persuasive authority or even instructive ofIdaho's LLUPA framework. Idaho's LLUPA
and case law applying LLUPA and the judicial review procedures of the lAP A are unique to
Idaho's legislative scheme for the land use process. Valley County has provided absolutely no
argument regarding how Washington or Maine land use laws relate to Idaho's LLUP A, or why
the wording or nature of the laws of those states should dictate the construction and application
ofIdaho's LLUPA.
Buckskin does not deny he holdings of the Maine court in Sold Inc. v. Town of Gorham,
868 A.2d 172 (2005) or the Washington court in James v. Kitsap 154 Wash.2d 574, 115 PJd 286
(2005). Both cases, however, were decided based on a specific statutory framework unique to
Maine and Washington. Again, there is absolutely no indication that land use laws in those
states are the same as or similar to Idaho's LLUPA. As pointed out directly above, not all land
use decisions under LLUPA are subject to judicial review. For example, an impact fee is not a
"pennit" under LLUP A and is not subject to judicial review under the lAP A.

Thus, unlike

Maine and Washington law, Idaho law does not allow judicial review of illegally collected
impact fees.
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5.

Exceptions to exhaustion of administrative remedies apply in this case.

Valley County argues that the recognized exceptions to exhausting administrative
remedies do not excuse Buckskin's alleged failure to seek judicial review in this case. The
County is incorrect.
As a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before the district cOUli
will hear a case challenging the validity of administrative acts. Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899,
906,854 P.2d 242,249 (1993); Park v. BanbUlY, 143 Idaho 576, 580-81,149 P.3d 851,855-56
(2006). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to that rule in two instances: (a)
when the interests of justice so require, or (b) when the agency acted outside its authority. Regan

v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721, 725, 100 P.3d 615,619 (2004); Park v. Banbury, 143 Idaho
576,580-81,149 P.3d 851, 855-56 (2006). In such circumstances, courts will not require a party
to exhaust administrative remedies.
Evidence contained in the Clerk's Record on appeal shows that the exceptions to the
exhaustion of administrative remedies rule apply in this case. The exceptions excused Buckskin
from any obligation to bring an appeal before the Valley County Board of Commissioners or the
district court. See e.g., Regan and Mccuskey supra.

a.

"Outside Agency Authority" Exception:

The district court correctly held that Buckskin met the exceptions to exhausting
administrative remedies because Valley County acted outside its authority to charge an impact
fee. Specifically, the court's Memorandum Decision reads:
It appears from the record that Valley County did not follow the provisions set
forth in the Idaho Development Impact Fee Act ("IDIF A") and Valley County
concedes as much. More specifically, Valley County failed to follow the
procedure for the imposition of development impact fees set forth in I.e. § 678206. As such, the Plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative
remedies because the proper administrative procedures were no in place.
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R. Vol. III, p. 491. There is ample evidence in the Clerk's Record to support the district court's
conclusion. See e.g., LUDO provisions CR. Vol. II, p. 298 and quoted directly below) and 2008
Master Transportation Plan (Appellant's Brief p. [J).

Based on those facts, Valley County

cannot credibly claim that it had authority to charge an impact fee. A more detailed discussion
explaining why Valley County has no authority to charge an impact fee is found below.

b.

"Interests of Justice" Exception

Buckskin also meets the interest of justice exception.

On this point, Valley County

argues that this exception cannot be met because Buckskin could have raised its concerns in a
timely petition for judicial review.

However, in order for that argument to work, Buckskin

would have had to have knowledge that the road impact fee was illegal, but still chose to proceed
from with the project anyway. There is nothing in the record that supports such a finding.
The interests of justice favor excusing

Bucks~in

from exhausting administrative remedies

based on the County's ordinances and polices that mislead the public into thinking that Valley
County had an IDIFA-compliant impact fee ordinance. Buckskin's Project Manager testified in
his affidavit that he was familiar with Valley County's LUDO and that he reviewed the LUDO
so he would know what was required to have a complete application. See R. Vol. II, p. 230

~~

4-

8, Ex. A. The Project Manager reviewed the LUDO provision applicable to PUD projects which
states in relevant part:

I.

DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT

Because of the uniqueness of each proposal a PUD may impact county services
and/or property which may be mitigated through a Development Agreement.
Compensation for these impacts shall be negotiated in work sessions with
appropriate county entities and a Development Agreement shall be entered into
between the applicant and the COU11ty through the Board as additional conditions
considered for approval of a PUD.
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J.

IMPACT FEES

The Commission may recommend to the B.oard impact fees as authorized by
Idaho Code Section 31-870 for any PUD proposal. The Board may implement the
impact fees as recommended by the Commission or as it deems necessary for the
proposal.
(emphasis added). As a result, Buckskin's Project Manager believed that Valley County had the
necessary authority to charge development impact fees. Any reasonable person reading that LUDO
provision would have reached the same conclusion as Mr. Pachner and would have no reason to
question whether the County followed the requirements of IDIF A.

The public has to have a

reasonable expectation that its local government is complying with state law. If every person is held
to the unreasonable standard that the public is held to the County proposes.

C.

Buckskin's State Taking Claim is Timely Under the Four Year Statute of
Limitations.
The district court detennined that the statute of limitations was triggered and accrued when

Buckskin first paid for Valley County's impact fee by dedicating a right-of-way to obtain final plat
approval for Phase 1 of The Meadows. Valley County argues that events even before the dedication
of the right-of-way for Phase 1 final plat approval triggered the statute of limitations. Both the
district court and Valley County are incorrect. Under the facts and circumstances involving a multiphase development project, the accrual of the statute of limitations for an inverse condemnation
claim is not triggered until final plat is sought and the fee is paid.
1.

Buckskin's inverse condemnation claim did not accrue when it gained
knowledge of Valley County's impact fee scheme or when it became apparent
that final plat approval would first require the payment of a road impact fee
because there had been no substantial interference with Buckskin's property
at that time.

The test for detennining when an inverse condemnation action accrues for purposes of the
statute of limitations "is to be fixed at the point in time at which the impaim1ent, of such a degree
and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became
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apparent." Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979). Valley
County wants this standard to be solely when it "became apparent." This abbreviated standard,
however, is not the standard under existing Idaho law. A substantial interference with property is
also required. Under Valley County's interpretation of the standard, the mere existence of the
LUDO and CIP triggers the statute oflimitation the moment any party submits and application.
Substantial interference under Tibbs is particularly relevant to the facts of this case
because The Meadows is a multi-phase development.

It does not matter that Buckskin's

development of The Meadows was covered by one CUP. Each subsequent phase requires final
plat approval from the Board of County Commissioners. See I.C. § 67-6504. Buckskin had no
obligation to pay any road impact fee until a phase came up for final plat and, for that matter, had
no obligation to seek final plat approval of any phase of development.

Until Buckskin was

required to pay the impact fee, its property had not been interfered with nor had it been taken.
There was no damage and nothing to complain of.
This is the distinction between this case and Harris v. State, 147 Idaho 401, 210 P.3d 86
(2009) and Wadsworth v. Idaho Department of Transportation, 128 Idaho 439, 915 P.2d 1 (1996)
cited by Valley County. In Wadsworth, for example, the plaintiff may not have been aware of the
full extent of his damages, but it had become apparent that there had been a substantial interference
with his property when the state excavated gravel upstream, which had an erosive effect on his land.
Wadsworth at 443,915 P.2d at 919. The same is true in Harris v. State

at the time the plaintiffs

entered into the sand and gravel lease with the State, their rights and obligations (including their
obligation to verify ownership) and the interference with their property was definite. Harris at 405,
210 PJd at 90.
Buckskin, on the other hand, had suffered no comparable interference with its property
when the CUP was issued, or even when right-of-way was dedicated under Phase 1 relative to
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subsequent phases. There must be a taking for there to be an inverse condemnation action. KMST,

LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 PJd 56, 60 (2003) (citing Covington v. Jefferson
County, 137 Idaho 777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002»; See also, Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho
85, 88-89, 730 P.2d 1005, 1008-09 (1986) ("we have never held that a statute of limitations may run
before an aggrieved party suffers damages."). The money remained in Buckskin's possession the
entire time until the impact fee had to be paid to obtain final plat approval.
The problem with affixing the accrual date as a date prior to the payment of the impact
fee in a multi-phase development project is exemplified by exactly what happened in this case.
Valley County can increase its road development fees without consequence every time a
developer seeks final plat approval more than four years after the date the CUP was issued. In
Buckskin's case Valley County updated its CIP under the West Roseberry Area 2007 Capital
Improvement Program Cost Estimate. The update resulted in more than doubling the impact fee
for a residential lot in The Meadows from $1,844 per single family lot to $3,968 per lot. R. Vol.
II, pp. 344,349; R. Vol. II, p. 350.
Even knowledge of the new, more than double, impact fee is not a substantial
interference with Buckskin's property. Valley County decries the potential effect of leaving
itself open to suit for four years after collecting an impact fee. Had Valley County complied
with IDIF A to collect impact fees, as it is required to and as it should have in this case, it would
have no such concem. See

I.e.

§ 67-8212 (providing an appeal and mediation process in the

event an impact fee is disputed). In the context of a multi-phase development Valley County
cannot hide behind the statute of limitations to increase impact fees without consequence.
Accrual on an inverse condemnation claim involving multi-phase development does not accrue
until the fee is paid because there is no substantial interference with the developer's property
prior to that time.
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2.

Buckskin's illegal tax/fee claim did not accrue simultaneously with its inverse
condemnation claim.

Buckskin's claims did not accrue at the same time and are not subject to the same accrual
standard for statute of limitationpurposes. Valley County argues that Buckskin's cause of action
arose simultaneously as to all claims and as to all phases because Buckskin's declaratory judgment
claim and inverse condemnation claim are "joined at the hip." Respondent's Brief, p. 25. As set
forth more thoroughly in Section E.1, below, Buckskin's claim for inverse condemnation and
declaratory judgment are wholly separate causes of action.

These claims arise from different

provisions of the Idaho and U.S. Constitutions, are subject to differing elements of proof, and are
subject to different standards for accrual for statute of limitations purposes. While these different
claims arise from and are based on the same set of facts, that hardly means that they accrued at the
same time for statute oflimitation purposes. See Section E.1, infra; LR.C.P. 8( e)(2).

3.

The facts and circumstances involved in a multi-phase development warrant
a different accrual standard for purposes of an inverse condemnation claim.

Valley County mischaracterizes Buckskin's argument for a change in the accrual standard
for inverse condemnation claims under the facts of a multi phase development project. Buckskin is
not requesting that this Court adopt the "project completion" rule from C&G, Inc. v. Canyon
Highway District No.4, l39 Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003). Buckskin is asking this Court, based
on the facts unique to a mUlti-phase development, including the fact that final plat approval on later
phases of a development may not be sought for several years after the initial pem1it approval, to
follow the precedence of C&G and adopt a different accrual trigger along the lines of the project
completion rule because the unique facts of multi-phase development and policy reasons support a
departure from the Tibbs standard.
Valley County argues that the policy reasons for departing from the accrual standard in
C&G should not apply in this case because C&G involved a physical taking. This argument is a
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distinction without any legal significance. There is no Idaho case law, including C&G, holding that
a departure from the Tibbs standard is warranted only. in a physical takings scenario. The type of
taking in C&G did not merit a depmiure from the Tibbs accrual standard, the facts and circumstance
warranted the departure.

As set forth in Buckskin's Appellant's Brief and here, the facts and

circumstances of this case likewise merit a departure from the Tibbs standard.
The same policy reasons for departing from Tibbs in C&G are present in cases involving
multi-phase development. As set forth in Buckskin's Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-21, these include the
speculative nature of damages at the outset of multi-phase development years before any decisions
might be made about a number of factors relevant to calculating a fee (such as the number oflots in
a given phase) and Valley County's own bad acts in flouting IDIFA and its unilateral increase of the
fees by more than double. A more appropriate accrual trigger in multi-phase development projects
is the time at which all impact fees are paid and Final Plat is approved on the very last phase, the
statute of limitations cannot accrue.
Valley County also argues that this Court should not depart from the Tibbs standard because
the RDA's state that the impact fee is "currently" set at a specified amount and, therefore, Buckskin
knew the fee could change. Respondent's Brief, p. 28. This argument is without merit. The word
"cUlTently" does put a party on notice that fees will be subject to increase. Equally important is the
fact that the word "currently" does not evidence consent to pay an increased fee. Valley County's
unilateral increase in fees that are not subject to review or protest merit a departure from the Tibbs
standard as set forth Buckskin's Appellant's Brief.
Finally, Valley County continues to argue that it should not be required to pay refunds years
after collecting the fees and after it has made substantial investments, which would shift the costs of
improvements to taxpayers. Valley County has not put any evidence into the record regarding what
investments it has made relative to Buckskin. More importantly, IDIF A provides safeguards to
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local governments charging impact fees in order to avoid this very problem. See

I.e.

§ 67-8212.

Having completely flouted Idaho law governing the collection of impact fees, Valley County cannot
now complain that it may be required to reimburse fees it collected illegally.

4.

Valley County admits that a claim based on the payment of an illegal and
unauthorized fee or tax accrues at the time of payment.

In addressing Buckskin's argument related to when a cause of action accmes for purposes of
a claim for an unauthorized and/or illegal tax or fee, Valley County admits that the claim accrues at
the time of payment. Respondent's Brief, p. 29-30. Yet surprisingly, Valley County charges that
the out-of-state cases cited by Buckskin in its opening brief for when an illegal tax/fee claim accrues
are inapposite. The point of the out-of-state cases cited by Buckskin is that the accmal standard for
an illegal or unauthorized fee or tax claim, an issue not previously decided by this Court, is when
the fee or tax is paid. Valley County apparently agrees.

D.

Buckskin's Actions were not Voluntary Within the Meaning of KMST.
Buckskin's entering into the RDA's and payment of road impact fees was not voluntary

in the sense of KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 557, 67 P.3d 56 (2003). Valley County
hangs its hat on the fact that Buckskin included a proposed development agreement and proposed
capital contribution agreement with its application to argue that the payment of impact fees was
voluntary.

Valley County, however, conveniently excuses away its own LUDO and policy

requirements for these agreements. Per Valley County's LUDO Buckskin had no choice but to
include these documents with its application, which is contrary to the facts of KMST.
Valley County's reliance on KMST as being indistinguishable from the facts of this case
is simply wrong. The "voluntary" act of the land use. applicant in KMST, unlike in this case, was
actually voluntary. In KMST the applicant, prior to submitting its land use application, met twice
with the supervisor of ACHD' s Development Services Division in order to determine what
ACHD staff may recommend regarding its application.
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KMST, at 579-580.

The ACHD

superVIsor informed the applicant that "he would recommend that KMST be required to
construct a street.. .and dedicate that street to the' public."

KMST, at 580.

Based on that

conversation, the applicant included with its application a statement that it would voluntarily
construct a public street and that such street would be the primary access for the development.

Id. After dedication of the street, the applicant sued Ada County for a taking.
This Court held that no taking had occurred because ACHD had no final authority to
approve or reject the property owners' proposed development. KMST, at 582. Moreover, the
court, in dicta, stated that even if ACHD did have final authority to approve some aspect of the
development, there was no taking because the property owner had voluntarily included the
dedication of the street based on the conversation it had with the ACHD supervisor. !d.
What happened in this case was drastically different from KMST.

There was no pre-

application meeting in this case where Buckskin elicited from Valley County representatives
their thoughts about what might give Buckskin's application a better chance for approval. The
LUDO required a development agreement and the payment of impact fees. R. Vol. II, p. 290.
This is also not a situation where Buckskin knew something was wrong, but chose to continue
with the project anyway as Valley County has attempted to characterize. There was no choice in
the matter because existing Valley County ordinances and policies required Buckskin to act. It
may be true that developers agree to things in the land use process that they might not
"voluntarily" do otherwise in order to get an approval, but Buckskin's payment of literally
hundreds of thousands of dollars in right-of-way dedication and monetary fees is not an example.
Buckskin included a proposed development agreement and a proposed capital
contribution agreement with its application, but only because those agreement were required by
the LUDO. See R. Vol. 11, p. 280

~~

4-8, Ex. A (p. 290). Buckskin was likewise informed that,

pursuant to the LUDO, road impact fees were required. R. Vol. 11, p. 280,
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6. Section II of the

table of contents of Buckskin's application clearly states that the portions of the application
including the proposed agreements were a requireme11t of Valley County's LUDO. See Affidavit
of Cynda Herrick (the "Herrick Affidavit," which was filed with the Clerk of the Court as an
exhibit to the Clerk's Record), Ex. C.

The proposed development agreement, which was

attached to the application as Appendix C, also unambiguously includes statements that show
that it was a required item with Buckskin's application. See !d. (sections 2.10, 2.11, and 2.21 of
the Appendix C). The proposed capital contribution agreement, attached as Exhibit A to the
proposed development agreement, arose as a result of Valley County's engineer and planning
director statements to Buckskin's representatives prior to submission of the application that the
capital contribution agreement was a requirement. See R. Vol. II, p. 280,

~

5-6.

Buckskin's proposed development agreement, which was typical of a form development
agreement, covered many topics generally relating to the development of a subdivision. See
Herrick Affidavit, Ex. 3, Appendix C. The parties never entered into the proposed development
agreement or the proposed capital contribution agreement. Valley County states that the parties
entered into RDA's with "slightly modified" terms from Buckskin's proposed agreements.
Other than the fact that Buckskin's proposed capital contribution agreement mentions road
impact fees, which Valley County's LUDO and representatives made patently clear was a
requirement for application approval, it is hardly similar to the RDA's prepared by Valley
County. See Herrick Affidavit, Ex. 3, Attachment A to Appendix C; compare R. Vol. II, pp.
334,344.
A sitting Valley County Planning and Zoning Commissioner at the time corroborates the
fact that Valley County fully intended that its road impact fee program be made mandatory for
all development applications.

Valley County's engineer met with the Planning and Zoning

Commission on February 14, 2004, to discuss traffic impact issues. R. Vol. I, p. 130,
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4-5,

Exs. A-B.

It was clear that payment of road impact fees was to be made a mandatory

requirement for approval of all land use applications regardless of whether the project was a
PUD or not. ld.

This was again reiterated at the public hearing for Buckskin's CUP/PUD

application on May 17, 2004.

ld.

This confirms the information previously conveyed to

Buckskin and why Buckskin included a proposed capital contribution agreement with its
application in the first place.
Valley County officials, including sitting Board of County Commissioner members and
the Planning and Zoning Administer openly admit that entering into Valley County drafted
RDA's and paying impact fees was not voluntary. See Affidavit of Victor S. Villegas (the
"Villegas Affidavit," which was filed with the Clerk of the Court as an exhibit to the Clerk's
Record), Ex. A (deposition of Gordon Cruickshank), p. 59, 1. 24
1. 16; p. 136,1. 18 - p. 138,1. 21; p. 77, 1. 11

p. 60, 1. 14; p. 88,1. 12

p.90,

p. 82, 1. 2; pp. 140-153,1. 6. The RDA language

itself was a standardized form contract with only the variation being the amounts required for
mitigating impacts. See Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 125,11. 2-7; Ex. C, p. 101-104.
One land use applicant in Valley County attempted to submit her own version of a RDA,
which included a statement that she was dedicating right-of-way under protest, but Valley
County refused to consider or allow the applicant's version. R. Vol. II, p. 398, ,; 5. There was
no negotiation with Valley County as to the contents of the RDA's or the fees paid pursuant to
the RDA's. See Villegas Affidavit, Ex. A, p. 40, 1. 11 - p. 42, 1. 18, p. 88 1. 12

p. 90,1. 16; Ex.

B, p. 93, 1. 3 - p. 96,1. 12. This was reflective of the experience of numerous land use applicants
in Valley County aside from Buckskin. See R. Vol. II, p. 365, ,;,; 4-6; R. Vol. III, p. 410,

,;~r

4-6;

R. Vol. I, p. 116,';'; 4-7; R. Vol. I, p. 130,'; 7; R. Vol. I, p. 185,';'; 4-6; R. Vol. I, p. 214,'; 3; R.
Vol. II, p. 245, ,;,; 2-7; R. Vol. II, p. 398, ';4; R. Vol. II, p. 259,'; 8).
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The mandatory nature of the RDA and payment of road impact fee is further illustrated
by instances where Valley County still required the agreement and payment of the fee in
seemingly in applicable situations such as where a property owner sought a lot split with no new
development and where an improved road already served the development. R. Vol. II, p. 259,
2-8, Ex. B-F; R. Vol. II, p. 245,

~

~~

5. Further, no developer, including Buckskin, was allowed to

schedule a hearing for Final Plat approval until the RDA was signed and the fee paid. See R.
Vol. II, p. 255,
Vol. I, p. 130,

~'13-4;

~

R. Vol. II, p. 365,

9; R. Vol. I, p. 185,

~

~

9; R. Vol. III, p. 410,

8; R. Vol. I, p. 214,

~

~

9; R. Vol. I, p. 116,

5; R. Vol. II, p. 245,

~

~

9; R.

6; R. Vol. II,

p. 398, ~6.
The facts of this case and Valley County's approach to RDA' s and road mitigation fees is
contrary to the facts in KMST; voluntariness, even in the sense of KMST, is clearly lacking in this
case. Execution of a RDA and payment of a road impact fee was a standard condition of final
plat approval that was placed on all development applications in Valley County. Buckskin was
simply fooled by Valley County's LUDO and statements from Valley County representatives
into believing that Valley County could legally require the payment of impact fees as a condition
of approval.

E.

Buckskin's Declaratory Judgment was Improperly Denied.
1.

Buckskin's declaratory judgment action is separate from its inverse
condemnation action, and accrued at a different time.

Valley County argues that there is no difference between Count I (declaratory judgment for
illegal tax or fee) and Count II (inverse condemnation) of Buckskin's Complaint, and that
Buckskin's claims are all the same. There is no legitimacy to Valley County's position. Buckskin
properly pled alternative theories of recovery. Each claim arises from a different provision of the
constitution - an illegal fee or tax claim arises from Article 7, Section 6 of the Idaho Constitution
and an inverse condemnation claim arises from Article 1, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution and
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Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Each claim involves different elements of
proof - an inverse condemnation claim requires proof of the fair market value of the property taken
whereas an illegal tax claim requires proof that the fee/tax was illegal under Idaho law.
Count I of Buckskin's Complaint clearly and unequivocally seeks a declaration from the
court that Valley County's RDA's and its requirement that Buckskin pay a propOliionate share fee
for road impacts is in violation ofIdaho Code section 67-8201 et. seq., and constitutes an illegal fee
or tax. R. Vol. I, p. 4. Count I says nothing about inverse condellli1ation or a taking of Buckskin's
property. !d.
Count II of the Complaint, on the other hand, is entitled "Inverse Condemnation

Violation

of State and Federal Constitution" and very clearly alleges a taking of propeliy without just
compensation.

R. Vol. I, p. 5. Count II says nothing about a declaratory judgment or about an

illegal fee or tax. Id. Rather, it asks for a judgment that the road impact fees paid by Buckskin
constitute a taking of its property.
A claim against a govemmental agency to recover payment of an illegal tax or fee is a
recognized cause of action under Idaho law. See Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768
P.2d 765 (1988); BHA Invs., Inc. v. City of Boise, 138 Idaho 356, 357-58, 63 PJd 482, 483-84

(2003); Idaho Bldg. Contractors Assn., Inc. v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326
(1995). The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure clearly allow for a plaintiff to plead altemative theories
and remedies from the same actions:
[a] party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense altematively or
hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in a separate counts or defenses.
When two or more statements are made in the. altemative and one of them if made
independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the
insufficiency of one or more of the altemative statements. A party may also state as
many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of consistency and
whether based on legal or equitable grounds or both. All statements shall be made
subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
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I.R.e.P. 8(e)(2); see also MK Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345,350,612 P.2d 1192, 1197

(1980); Assocs. Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (1987); Murr v.
Odmark, 112 Idaho 606,733 P.2d 827 (Ct. App. 1987).
These claims were properly pled as alternative theories of recovery and alternative methods
of seeking a remedy in this case. The claims did not accrue at the same time and the district court
erred in its determination on the question of accrual.
2.

Buckskin's declaratory judgment claim is not mooted by Valley County's
Resolution 11-6.

Valley County argues that Resolution 11-6 moots Buckskin's declaratory claims as to future
phases of The Meadows because it is a waiver of the RDA requirement. There is no waiver of the
RDA requirement in Resolution 11-6. Section 2 of Resolution 11-6 clearly contemplates that there
will indeed be RDA's required in the future, which will be subject to further "negotiation" with
Valley County. See R. Vol. III, p. 553. Absent an IDIFA-compliant ordinance, there is simply
nothing to negotiate with regard to offsite public roadway improvements.
Valley County further attempts to skirt Resolution 11-6 by claiming that Buckskin misreads
its underlying ordinance, which requires the payment of "impact fees," because the reference to
Idaho Code section 31-870 in the LUDO makes it clear that there is nothing improper with the
ordinance. "Impact fee" is a term of art with a specific legal definition. See I.e. § 67-8203(15).
The term does not appear anywhere in Idaho Code section 31-870 and the types of fees a county has
authority to charge under section 31-870 have nothing to do with land use approvals.

Valley

County did not use the term "impact fee" in its LUDO by accident. When Section I of the LUDO's
PUD provision is read in conjunction with Section J, the payment of fees are the types of fees
contemplated in IDIFA. The relevant portions of the LUDO read:
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I.

DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT

Because of the uniqueness of each proposal a PUD may impact county services
and/or property which may be mitigated through a Development Agreement.
Compensation for these impacts shall be negotiated in work sessions with
appropriate county entities and a Development Agreement shall be entered into
between the applicant and the county through the Board as additional conditions
considered for approval of a PUD.

J.

IMPACT FEES

The Commission may recommend to the Board impact fees as authorized by
Idaho Code Section 31-870 for any PUD proposal. The Board may implement the
impact fees as recommended by the Commission or as it deems necessary for the
proposal.
(emphasis added).

This

IS

an ordinance, which cannot be amended merely by passage of a

resolution.
3.

Buckskin's declaratory judgment claim is ripe.

Valley County fllrther argues that if Buckskin's declaratory judgment claims are not moot,
then they are not ripe because Buckskin could be required to do nothing further under Resolution
11-6 since the roads are already built. Valley County provides absolutely no evidence in the record
what roads have allegedly been built or how or why Buckskin could be required to do nothing
further. This is contrary to the language of Resolution 11-6, which still requires developers to enter
into RDA' s with Valley County to address offsite public roadways. If there was nothing furiher to
be done with regard to offsite public roads, Resolution 11-6 should simply state that until an IDIFAcompliant ordinance is enacted, there will be no more RDA's at all. That's not what Resolution 116 says, however. It still requires developers to enter into RDA's and it clearly implies the threat of
denial of final plat applications if road impact fees are not voluntarily paid.
In an attempt gain an advantage and to convince this Court that it will waive the RDA
requirement under Resolution 11-6, Valley County refers to a separate matter involving the same
legal issues presented in this appeal and involving the same legal counsel. See Respondent's Brief,
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p. 36, n. 26. That case is currently pending in federal district court, White v. Valley County, 2011
WL 4583846 (D. Idaho). While undersigned counsel does not deny the facts alluded to by opposing
counsel, there is more to story than is set forth in footnote 26 of Respondent's Brief. Furthem1ore, it
provides no guarantee that Valley County will follow suit in other cases.

F.

The issue of whether Valley County can use a development agreement to collect
impact fees is not raised for the first time on appeal.
In response to Buckskin's arguments regarding Valley County's authority to reqUIre

Buckskin to enter into RDA's and whether Resolution 11-6 moots Buckskin's declaratory judgment
claims, Valley County asserts that this is an issue raised for the first time on appeal. This is simply
inaccurate. This issue is raised as a result of Resolution 11-6, which Valley County enacted only
days before the district court's second Memorandum Decision below and well after the Buckskin
had briefed the issues. Section 67-6511A ofLLUPA is part of the authority cited in Resolution 116 justifying Valley County's RDA program.

Further, Valley County's "first time on appeal"

argument ignores Buckskin's Complaint, which very clearly seeks a declaratory ruling on the
validity of Valley County's RDA scheme. Valley County also mischaracterizes Buckskin's position
on this question much too broadly.
Valley County approved Resolution 11-6 on March 7, 201l. R. Vol. III, p. 55l. This
was well over a year after Buckskin initiated this litigation and well after Valley County moved
for summary judgment and the district court made its decision on summary judgment. After the
district court issued its memorandum decision on summary judgment, Valley County moved for
an entry of judgment to dismiss all of Buckskin's claims, to which Buckskin objected on the
basis that summary judgment had not disposed of all its claims. R. Vol. III, p. 498, 510. On
March 9, 2011, two days after passing Resolution 11-6, Valley County replied to Buckskin's
objection, in part, on grounds that Resolution 11-6, rendered Buckskin's declaratory claims
moot. R. Vol. III, pp. 540, 548, Ex. 1.
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The district court issued a second ruling on April 11, 2011, dismissing Buckskin's entire
Complaint with prejudice partly on the basis that Valley County's freshly minted Resolution 116 rendered Buckskin's claims moot. See R. Vol. III, p. 577. Given the claim in Buckskin's
Complaint for a declaratory ruling on the RDA scheme, and the timing of Valley County's
passage of Resolution 11-6 and that it was a basis relied on by the district court to dismiss
Buckskin's declaratory judgment claims, it is unclear how Valley County now attempts to
dispose of this issue on grounds that it is being raised for the first time on appeal. Valley
County's authority to force Buckskin to enter into the RDA's has been an issue from the
commencement of this litigation, and was further put at issue based on Valley County's
enactment of Resolution 11-6 and the district court's subsequent reliance on Resolution 11-6 to
dismiss Buckskin's declaratory judgment claim. This is not an issue raised for the first time on
appeal.
Resolution 11-6 states that: "the County undertook the program and actions described above
in the good faith belief that it had the authority to do so under its police power and the following
statutory provisions: ... Idaho Code § 67-6511A, which authorized development agreements in
connection with rezones ... ". R. Vol. III, p. 552. Section 67-6511A provides authority to: "require
or permit as a condition of rezoning that an owner or developer make a written commitment
concerning the use or development of the subject parcel." I.e. § 67-6511A (emphasis added). The
emphasized language is vitally important because it demonstrates that Valley County has no
authority under section 67 -6511A to require Buckskin to negotiate development agreements
addressing the payment of impact fees. The only type of "development agreement" in the Idaho
Code authorizing the conditioning of a land use approval on the payment of an impact fee for
proportional impacts to offsite public roadways is found in IDIF A. See I.C. § 67 -8203( 10).
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G.

The Five Year Statute of Limitations for Contract Claims Applies to Buckskin's
Declaratory Judgment Claims in this Case.
The five year statute of limitations for actions upon a contract should apply to Buckskin's

declaratory judgment claims. Contrary to Valley County's characterization, Buckskin's contract
theory is not a mere afterthought. Valley County chides Buckskin for not citing to any case law
supporting that the five year statute of limitations applies in a situation such as this where the
plaintiff is not complaining of a breach of the contract. Buckskin's basis for asserting the five-year
statute of limitations for its declaratory judgment claim is based on the plain language of Idaho
Code section 5-216, which states: "[a]n action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded
upon an instrument in writing."

Section 5-216 does not say "an action for breach upon any

contract," or otherwise suggest that the limitations period applies only to a claim of breach of
contract. Rather, it says any action upon a contract without any requirement that the action involve a
breach. I.e. § 5-216.
The language of the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act clearly illustrates that "an action
upon a contract" may be brought without a breach. Under this Act, Idaho cOUlis "have power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed."
I. e. § 10-120 l. Further, any party with an interest in a contract is entitled to a ruling under this Act
determining rights, validity or status. I.e. § 10-1202. In fact, declaration to construe a contract may
be sought before or after a breach. I.C. § 10-1203 (emphasis added). The authority of courts to
render a declaration is broad where such a determination will resolve an issue or remove
uncertainty. I.C. § 10-1205.
A claim for a declaratory judgment regarding the illegality of a contract or the subject matter
of a contract is clearly an appropriate cause of action under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See e.g.

Taylor v. AlA Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 564, 261 P.3d 829, 841 (20ll). In Taylor, this COUli
upheld the district court's declaration that the contract at issue was illegal and in violation ofIdaho
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law governing the subject matter of the contract. ld. at 564, 261 P.3d at 842; see also Wernecke v.

St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,288 n. 12,207 P.3d 1008, lO19 n. 12 (2009)
(recognizing the circumstances under which the innocent party to an illegal contract is entitled to
relief). While one of the claims in Taylor involved a claim for breach of contract, once the contract
was declared illegal the breach of contract claim was dismissed by the district cOUli. Taylor v. AlA

Servs. Corp., at 551, 261 P.3d at 850. The claim for a declaratory judgment on the legality of the
contract was "an action upon contract" without regard to whether it was breached. ld.
The statute of limitations for a declaratory action to determine the legality of a contract is an
action upon any contract. See I.e. § 5-216. Valley County required the payment of illegal impact
fees through contractual arrangements, namely the
illegal.

RpA. The subject matter of the contracts is

Buckskin has simply requested a declaration that the RDA's are void because Valley

County had no legal authority to require that Buckskin pay an impact fee under the RDA's.

H.

Idaho Code § 67-6512 Does Not Authorize The Collection Of Impact Fees.
Valley County argues that despite not having an IDIF A compliant ordinance for the

collection of impact fees, it has statutory authority under LLUPA to do so.

Specifically, the

County relies on Idaho Code § 67-6512(d)(6) language which reads
(d) Upon the granting of a special use permit, conditions may be attached to a
special use permit including, but not limited to, those:

(6) Requiring the provision for on-site or off-site public facilities or services;
I.C. § 67-6512(d)(6). According to the County, since that statute permits local govemments to
impose conditions on developers requiring offsite facilities or services, it is a sort of "miniIDIFA" that allowed Valley County to collect an impact fee.
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While the County's interpretation of I.C. § 67-6512(d)(6) is certainly imaginative, it is
not a reasonable construction of that code section. There is absolutely nothing contained in the
plain language of I.C. § 67-6512 that authorizes the collection of an impact fee. In fact, the word
"fee" is not even used in that statute at all.

Valley County certainly cannot argue that the

legislature does not know how to use the word "fee" for the legislature does so in LLUP A.
There is express language in LLUP A that requires that all "[ fJees established for purposes
of mitigating the financial impacts of development must comply with chapter 82, title 67 Idaho
Code [IDIFA]." I.e. § 67-6513, Ch. 142, § 3, 2003 Sess. Laws 414. That statement in § 676513 expresses the legislature's intent that IDIF A is the sole source of a local government's
authority to collect impact fees.

The inclusion of that language in § 67-6513 evidences the

legislature's intent to let local governments know that the land use powers granted under LLUP A
do not the power to collect impact fees.

I.

Equitable Principles do not Dictate Dismissal of any of Buckskin's Claims.
Valley County asserts that Buckskin's claims should also be dismissed on equitable

principles. Valley County cannot hide behind equitable theories in light of its own conduct. The
doctrine of unclean hands allows "a court to deny equitable relief to a litigant on the ground that
his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the
controversy at issue." Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 251, 92 P.3d 492,501 (2004). Valley
County extracted the payment of road impact fees from Buckskin and similarly situated
developers in violation of IDIF A. Its strained use of the term "voluntary" does not establish
otherwise. Forcing Buckskin and all other developers to enter into RDA's in order to circumvent
or flout very specific state law requirements for proportionate payments of impact fees is
inequitable, unfair and illegal.

Valley County's unclean hands deprive it of any equitable

defense against Buckskin's claims.
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Valley County's equitable principles defense is based entirely on completely unsupported
(and assuredly disputed) factual assertions. These unsupported factual asseliions include: that
"Buckskin benefitted substantially from its arrangement" with Valley County; that "[t]hose roads
are now in place" (implying that the roads did not preexist Buckskin's application); that
Buckskin's development would be "sitting on undeveloped land served by dirt or gravel roads;"
and that "the County performed the substantial service of designing, financing, and building the
road network to serve The Meadows." See Respondent's Brief, pp. 44-45. There is not one
shred of evidence in the record to support Valley County's factual assertions regarding the roads.
With absolutely no evidence to support the facts nece'ssary to affirmatively establish the elements
of these equitable theories, Valley County's equitable principles defense does not merit further
consideration.

J.

The County is not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal.
Valley County's Respondent's Brief/Cross Appellant's Brief makes no effort to distinguish

whether its arguments on attorney fees relate to its cross appeal or a request for attorney fees on
appeal. To the extent Valley County has cross appealed the district court's denial of its motion for
an award of attorney fees below, Buckskin is entitled to address those issues as part of a separate
Cross Respondent's brief, which Buckskin has filed concurrently with this Reply Brief. Buckskin
only addresses Valley County's claim for attorney fees on appeal in this Reply Brief.
Valley County claims an entitlement to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section
12-117 and Idaho Code section 12-121. Valley County is not entitled to an award of attorney fees
on appeal under either attorney fees statute. Idaho Code section 12-117 provides that in a judicial
proceeding involving a governmental entity, the prevailing party is entitled to an award of
reasonable attorney fees if the Court finds that the other party acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law.

The purpose of this statute is: (1) to deter arbitrary or groundless action by the
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government agency; and (2) to provide a remedy for financial burdens attempting to correct
mistakes made by the governmental agency. Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140
Idaho 115, 118,90 P.3d 340,343 (2004). A party acts without a reasonable basis in fact or law only
when the party's pursuit of its claims is frivolous, without foundation or unreasonable. Karr v.
Bermeosolo, 142 Idaho 444, 449, 129 P.3d 88,93 (2005).
Buckskin, for the reasons set forth in this Reply Brief and in its Appellant's Brief, does not
believe that Valley County will prevail on appeal. Even if this Court affirms the district court's
decision below, Valley County is not entitled to an award of any fees on appeal. There is nothing to
indicate or establish that Buckskin acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law in pursuing this
appeal.
Buckskin pursued its claims on appeal in good faith and with a reasonable basis in law and
fact.

In arguing for attorney fees on appeal, Valley County claims that Buckskin pursued this

appeal in defiance of settled authority on issues such as the statute of limitation, KMST, and other of
Valley County's defenses, which Buckskin challenged below but has not appealed. The district
court below based its ruling solely on the statute of limitations issue, which Buckskin has addressed.
These other defenses that Valley County claims Buckskin did not appeal were not paIi of the district
court's decision and were not a basis to appeal. In fact, the district court detern1ined that Valley
County's impact fee violated IDIF A, that Buckskin had no obligation to exhaust administrative
remedies because Valley County's impact fee is illegal, and that voluntariness was not relevant. R.
Vol. III, pp. 491-92. The district court's findings confirm that Buckskin did not seek this appeal
frivolously or in bad faith.
What is more, Buckskin's appeal included at least two issues not previously ruled on by this
Court, and thus are issues of first impression. First, this Court has never decided the applicability of
the Tibbs standard of accrual to a multi-phase development project or whether a departure from this
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standard is warranted under the facts of a mUlti-phase development project, similarly to what this
Court decided C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No.4., cited supra. Buckskin pursued this
appeal in good faith seeking such a departure because of the unique circumstances involving multiphased developments. Secondly, Buckskin pursued this appeal on the basis that its illegal tax claim
did not accrue at the same time as its inverse condemnation claim. The standard of accrual for such
a claim has not been determined by this Court and is likewise a matter of first impression. As these
are matters of first impression, Valley County is not eligible for an award of attorney fees on appeal.

Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 862, 863, 204 P.3d 502,503 (2009).
Finally, Valley County's actions on appeal establish that it, not Buckskin, has acted
frivolously and without a reasonable basis in fact or law. This is primarily illustrated by Valley
County's numerous misrepresentations of the underlying facts or failure to provide any support in
the record for its factual claims, including, as addressed above, that it has designed and built celiain
roads pursuant to its CIP and RDA scheme. Valley County has provided no such evidence in the
record.
For all of these reasons, Valley County is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal,
under either Idaho Code Section 12-117 or 12-121. Buckskin, if the prevailing party, is entitled to
an award of costs or fees as set forth in its Appellant's Brief.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and in Buckskin's Appellants' Brief, the district court's
grant of summary judgment should be reversed.
DATED this 20 th day of January, f012.
EVANS KEANE

By
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